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NOTES on SELF-INCRIMINATION
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRIVATE DOCUMENTS AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
The privilege against self-incrimination has been under sporadic
criticism' almost from the time that it became imbedded in the English
law. However during the last two decades the criticism has reached
a veritable crescendo. The criticism has not be'en confined to the staid
legal periodicals.2 Nor has it been confined to any single political
party.3 In short, the policy of the privilege is undergoing a most
thorough re-examination.
It is not the purpose of this paper to go into an extended disserta-
tion on the merits of this dispute. This paper will attempt to consider
only the questions involved whenever the use of personal4 documents
as evidence is assailed as being in contravention of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Since the discussion is primarily about docu-
ments, and not about the privilege against self-incrimination per se,
other aspects of the document problem will be discussed, particularly
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, the "unreasonable searches
and seizures" section of the United States Constitution.5 At first glance
it might appear that bringing the Fourth Amendment problems within
the ambit of this discussion is making an unwarranted extension of
the subject matter of the paper which, of course, centers around the
Fifth Amendment. But it will be seen that the courts have occasionally
done the same thing and have even regarded the two Amendments as
1 For example, the privilege was vigorously attacked by Jeremy Bentham and
the British utilitarians during the 19th Century. 7 BENTHAM, WoRKS 445-472(Bowring's Ed. 1848).
2For example, see American Mercury 79:111-114 (July 1954); Common-
weal 61:508-509 (Feb. 11, 1955).
3 Today it is the so-called liberals who defend the privilege against those who
see in it a refuge for Communists. During the 80's, these same liberals assailed
it as a sanctuary for businessmen who were being investigated for violations of
the anti-trust laws, the income tax laws and the like.
4 There is considerable difference in result when corporate documents and not
private documents are sought by the state. It is well settled that the self-incrimina-
tion clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to corporations. Wilson v.
U.S., 221 U.S. 861 (1911); Hale v. Hinkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Nor to unin-
corporated associations. U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). The discussion
here is limited to personal documents.
The corresponding state constitutional provisions will be involved here also.
No special effort will be made to differentiate between the scope of the Federal
Constitutional provisions and the corresponding state provisions. Essentially they
are the same.
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overlapping. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment aspects of the docu-
ment problems are well within the scope of our discussion. It will
also be noted that this paper will not attempt to deal with many other
aspects involved in using documents as evidence, for example, the
problem of the hearsay rule. Our examination will, in general, center
around the role the privilege against self-incrimination plays in using
documents as evidence.
Throughout this note, it will be assumed that the privilege in its
narrower sense will be recognized: the privilege of a witness to refuse
to testify orally at any official proceeding when to do so might tend to
incriminate him.6 It will also be assumed that the privilege does not
protect the accused from having incriminating objects removed from
his person, from giving blood samples, from being fingerprinted, from
submitting to physical examinations, and from performing certain
actions in order to aid in his identification.7 It is within these limits
that the writer will discuss the privilege as it applies to documents.
By their very nature, documents are somewhere in between the
above two categories. In one sense a document is words; in another
sense it is a physical object. Words cannot ordinarily be extracted from
an unwilling defendant in order to convict him; but things, for ex-
ample, blood or a murder weapon, can. In which category will docu-
ments be placed?
It is believed that documents should be, and are, treated as articles
or things, and not as words. Most of the constitutional protections
hedging about the use of documents as evidence are believed to be
consistent with this position.
The leading case on the subject is Boyd v. United States., In that
case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute requiring the
defendant in a forfeiture proceeding either to produce certain relevant
documents, or to have the facts alleged by the prosecution taken to be
true. The court held that such a law in effect required the defendant
to be a witness against himself since it required him to furnish by his
own actions the evidence against himself.
In so doing, the court did not apply to documents a rule different
6 The writer is firmly convinced that this doctrine should remain in the law.
However, even if the writer were of the opposite opinion, it is still believed that
any profitable discussion of the broader ramifications of the privilege would neces-
sarily have to be developed within a framework recognizing the privilege. The
possibility of destroying the privilege by Constitutional amendment is too remote
to be worthy of consideration.
7 8 WirMon., EVIDENCE 362 (3rd Ed., 1940); McComu~ncx, EVIDENCE 264
(1954); * Ky. L.J. 0 (1955).8 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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from that which would have been applied to chattels.0 The govern-
ment should not be able to force the defendant to actually give up any
evidence he holds; the government must procure its own evidence.
Attempts to extract such evidence from the defendant by the use of a
subpoena duces tecum as well as by attempts to employ a "presump-
tion" (as in the Boyd case) should be equally deplored. There are
several reasons for this.
The first is purely historical: such things have never been permitted
by Anglo-Saxon law. The second is that to do so would convert our
essentially accusatorial criminal system into an inquisatorial one. The
Common Law assumes that proceedings will be adversary and that
each side will present to the fact-finders its own position in the best
light and in so doing will procure its own witnesses and its own evi-
dence. This too is essentially only a matter of past practice. Either,
of course, can be changed if no practical basis for it exists.
However, it is believed that strong policy considerations do exist
for the privilege, especially when such evidence is sought by a sub-
poena. The reason usually given for the existence of the privilege to
refuse to answer such a subpoena is that to answer it would require
that the presenter of evidence vouch for its authenticity.10 This would
force the defendant to testify and would therefore be a violation of his
privilege to refuse to testify at his own trial. It is believed, however,
that this argument is defective. It does not necessarily follow that the
producing witness will have to testify to the authenticity of the evi-
dence produced. Once the evidence was in the possession of the
police, little or no corroboration would be necessary in most cases. If
needed, outside witnesses could usually be found to supply it. How-
ever there are other less technical justifications for the existence of the
privilege.
The refusal of a person to produce documents demanded by a
subpoena duces tecum can subject him to punishment for contempt
if the court feels that his refusal is unjustified. In many cases the
accused will maintain that he is physically unable to produce any
evidence, since he does not have it in his possession. The court may
not believe the defendant and may order him to produce it anyway,
or stand guilty of contempt. If the deefndant's refusal is necessitated
9 NVIWMoni, op. cit, supra note 7, 363; Evans v. State, 106 Ga. 519, 32 S.E.
659 (1899) (Defendant can't be forced to hand over a weapon.); Lord Mansfield,
in Roe v. Harvey, 4 Burr. 2484, at 2489 (1769)... [I]n a criminal or penal
cause the defendant is never forced to produce any evidence; even though he
should hold it in his hands, in court."; McConancK, op. cit. supra note 7, 264.
10 See, for example, the discussion of Professor Wigmore. 8 WiGMoRE, op. cit.
supra note 7, 364.
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because he actually does not have the evidence, his punishment for
contempt is obviously unjust. Even if he does have it and is in fact
guilty, punishing him in this manner smacks of a violation of his
right to a jury trial. For even if such compulsory production of evi-
dence were strictly limited to cases which it was certain that the de-
fendant actually could produce the evidence, it would still permit a
determination by a judge and not by a jury as to the existence of what
might be a material ingredient of a crime. Furthermore, once the doc-
trine that a person could be forced to furnish evidence against himself
was firmly established in the law, other abuses might easily follow. It
is a narrow line between forcing a man to do something by imprison-
ment for contempt and forcing him to do the same thing by cruder
but much more effective means-torture.
Merely requiring an accused to furnish evidence on pain of having
the fact admitted against him would present fewer difficulties than
arise when the subpoena method is used, but it is believed that es-
sentially the policy considerations listed above would still apply. An
innocent person who was actually unable to produce the evidence
could be convicted. At best, such a rule operates to shift the burden
of proof to the accused, and conflicts strongly with the Common Law
tradition that a person is innocent until proved guilty. At any rate, the
doctrine that a person cannot be forced to actually produce chattels
or documents as evidence against himself is well established in the
law.11
However, the Supreme Court in the Boyd case was unwilling to
rest its opinion on this basis alone. The court proceeded to state that
evidence consisting of documents could not be obtained even under
a valid search warrant. The theory was that the Fourth Amendment,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amend-
ment were so closely related as to overlap in this case, and that both
afforded protection. Professor Wigmore has rejected this reasoning
of the Court.'2 Wigmore says that to treat the Fourth and the Fifth
Amendments as overlapping, is to ignore the different historical back-
grounds and the different purposes of the two doctrines. However,
the Federal courts have continued to hold that in some cases the
privileges run concurrently.' 3 While there is some merit to the Boyd
position that the two privileges overlap, it is believed that the prin-
11 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, 363. McComnci; op. cit. supra note 7,
264. In fact, the principle seems so universally accepted that there are very few
cases on the point.
12 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, 366-369.
13 Davis v. U.S., 328 U.S. 582; 594 (1946); Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928).
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ciples involved can be more precisely analyzed if the two are re-
garded as separate, and the Wrigmore position is to be preferred.
In addition to attacking the reason of the court, Professor Wigmore
has also attacked the idea that documents cannot be seized even under
a valid search-warrant; WVigmore feels that in the Boyd case the "seeds
of a dangerous heresy were sown."' 4 Wigmore insists that such is not
the law and cites numerous federal cases which he regards as amount-
ing to a repudiation of this part of the Boyd rule.'5 The notion that
documents are completely immune from search and seizure is gone.
But it still appears to be the federal rule that documents and chattels,
if of a purely evidentiary nature, cannot be seized under a valid
search warrant. 16 Such articles may be seized only when they are
contraband, or when they are themselves criminal, or when they are
instrumentalities of crime.' 7 A discussion of this limitation on the
power to search appears in order.
It is possible that this limitation on the power to search is re-
stricted to searches under warrants, or searches of the surrounding
premises made incident to an arrest. If the person is legally searched,
and merely evidentiary documents are found, the evidence obtained
may be used, at least according to some authority.'8 Purely evidentiary
documents may be used if they come into the government's hands
without a search. 10 Ordinary documents do not therefore appear to be
incompetent as evidence. They just can't be searched for, under ordi-
nary circumstances.
The rule that purely evidentiary documents cannot be sought even
under a valid search warrant is based partially on statute at the present
time.20 However, the Supreme Court has indicated that search warrant
law could not constitutionally be altered to permit such action.2 1 In
so doing, the court, it is submitted, is freezing the search warrant into
its Eighteenth Century form, a practice which the writer feels should
14 8 WIGomOn, op. cit. supra note 7, 367. 15 Id. at 370.
I' U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298
(1921); also, of course, Boyd v. U.S., supra note 7; 47 Am. JuR. 534 (1943);
Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33
IowA L. REv. 472, 488 (1948).
17 Fraenkel, supra note 16, at 487; Gouled v. U.S., supra note 16. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 41(b). 41(b) also permits the seizure of proper when it is being
used by the agent of a foreign government to violate the laws of the United States.
This provision is of slight concern to us here though. There is also authorization
for search warrants in other sections of the Statutes, but they are no broader in
scope than the provisions here.
18See U.S. v. Krischenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926); 32 A.L.R. 680,
689 (1924).
19 Stroud v. U.S., 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
20 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b).
21 For example, Boyd v. U.S., supra note 8, at 630.
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be deplored. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. It is not believed that it is unreasonable per se to let
officers search for something which they could use in evidence if it
came into their possession in some other fashion. In other words, a
search for articles purely for their evidential value should not be
automatically prohibited.
It might appear to the reader that the writer is advocating a rule
which would permit illegally obtained evidence to be used if the same
evidence would have been admissible if legally obtained. But this is
not the case. The writer's thesis is that there should be provided some
legal way of obtaining these documents. Such a rule is in no way in-
compatible with the so-called "exclusionary" rule, which prohibits
using as evidence the fruits of an illegal search.
An incidental, but not inconsequential, advantage of making all
documents susceptible to seizure 22 is that it would no longer be neces-
sary to show that a seized document is criminal in itself, or that it was
rightfully the property of the government, or that it was an instru-
mentality of crime. In some cases, it is almost impossible to determine
whether a particular document is in one of these categories or is
merely "evidence."23
Thus it is felt that the federal rule as to when documents may be
searched for and seized is the same as that used when chattels and not
documents are involved. Exactly the same "exceptions" are recognized;
chattels may not be sought under a search warrant unless they are
criminal in themselves, rightfully the property of the government, or
instrumentalities of crime.24
It seems to the writer that the limitations just examined are purely
Fourth Amendment limitations. The evidence cannot be obtained
under a search warrant because the search warrant, in the historical
sense (and, therefore, so runs the argument, in the constitutional sense)
is not this broad. Assuming that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
"overlap" and that the Fifth can be called to the aid of the Fourth in
this type of case, it is still felt that nothing will be changed. For the
Fifth Amendment is just not applicable here.
To be sure, the admission of such evidence would convict a de-
22 If, of course, all other requirements of the law of Search and Seizure are
met.
23 Compare the Lefkowitz case, supra note 16 and Marron v. U.S., 275 U.S.
192 (1927). See Zap v. U.S., 328 U.S. 624 (1946) where the Supreme Court
apparently split on whether a forged check was an "instrumentality' of a crime
(page 629) or "evidence" of a crime. (page 632); U.S. v. Brengle, 29 F. Supp.
190 (W.D. Va. 1939).24 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) clearly shows that documents and chattels are
treated alike.
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fendant by his own words. But this can be done. Statements a de-
fendant made to a third party are, in certain cases, admissible as evi-
dence against him, for example, statements which constitute an ad-
mission of guilt.25 There seems to be no self-incrimination involved in
admitting as evidence such statements if made orally to others. It is
difficult to see how the fact that they were in writing could make any
difference, in so far as the privilege against self-incrimination is con-
cerned.
It might be argued that the fact that such statements are un-
communicated to another person makes a difference. Convicting a
person from his own mind has an ominous ring in the light of our re-
cent "brain-washing" experience. But incriminating statements, which
in contemplation of law were uncommunicated, since made under
some privileged relationship, can be used as evidence if overheard by
a third party, even though an eavesdropper.
26
It has been suggested that if merely evidentiary documents can be
used as evidence, prosecutions based on mere opinion can be in-
itiated.2 However, if the ordinary rules on using opinions as evidence
are followed, it is difficult to see how prosecutions could result. There
seem to be no valid Fifth Amendment objections to using documents
as evidence and in fact, that amendment is usually regarded as in-
applicable in this situation.28 Is there, then, any good reason for the
present law which does not permit purely evidential document to be
soug;ht for evidence?
The only policy objection to admitting writings as evidence is a
Fourth Amendment objection: To seize a person's documents and then
use them as evidence against him is a violation of that person's privacy.
This argument is based on the idea that if documents could be seized
and used as evidence, all sorts of pryings into a man's personal papers
and effects would inevitably result. This does not follow. The same
requisites for getting a search warrant would still exist. Unless there
were probable cause and an adequate description of the articles to be
seized, no warrant could issue.29 No blanket searches of a man's ef-
fects would be permitted.
It is submitted that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to
prohibit all searches for purely evidentiary material. It is the writer's
• Students of Evidence will recall that such statements constitute "admis-
sions of party-opponent" and as such are regarded as an exception to the hearsay
rule. McCormuck, op. cit. supra note 7, 502-504. Some states also regard them
as "declarations against interest." McCowacK, id. at 549-551.214Id. at 162; 50 Am. Jun. 216 (1948).
27 Fraenkel, supra note 16, 488. 28 58 Am. JiR. 46, n. 2 (1948).
29 U.S. CONSTIrunON, AmENDNENT IV.
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belief that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent the use of
general warrants and writs of assistance, both so odious to the Ameri-
can colonists. To infer from the words of the Fourth Amendment that
the Founding Fathers intended to deny the government any power to
search for ordinary documents is to read things into the text of the
Amendment and to overlook the really important influence that the
writs of assistance and general warrants had not only in causing the
Revolution, but in causing a formulation of the idea of a limited gov-
ernment. In enacting the Fourth Amendment, the Founders struck at
the really serious abuses with which they were familiar. It is highly
unlikely that the "grievance" of searching for evidentiary documents
was ever contemplated by any of the authors of the Bill of Rights.30
Up to this point the discussion has centered around the federal
law on this subject. Just what it is, is not absolutely certain. It is to
be expected then that the various state rules, which unlike the federal
rule did not arise from one single source, will be in considerably more
confusion. Apparently most states would permit searches for merely
evidentiary documents, if such searches were otherwise legal.31 There
are few cases exactly in point; most of the alleged state rules are based
on dicta. It is, of course, the universal rule that an individual in a
criminal case may not be forced to produce document to be used
against himself.
32
In the final analysis policy and reason, not precedent, should de-
termine the law. In this particular area where precedents are so con-
fused, it is particularly important to weigh the underlying policy con-
siderations. The writer therefore suggests that in the light of the dis-
cussion above, the law should include the following principles:
(1) No person should be compelled either by subpoena or by the
use of "presumptions" to actually produce for the prosecution any
evidence, whether documents or chattels, regardless of whether he can
in fact do so. This is now the law.
(2) That no search shall be held illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby inadmissible, merely because such evidence consists of ordi-
nary documents, that is, documents not the property of the govern-
ment, nor criminal in themselves nor instrumentalities of crime. Articles
which are evidence of crime, including documents which are admis-
sible in evidence under ordinary circumstances, should be subject to
30 It is believed that Wigmore is essentially in accord with the writer. 8 Wic-
MORE, op cit supra note 7, 368.
3147 Azi. JuR. 534 (1943); 129 A.L.R. 1296 (1940).
32 8 WInMORE, op. cit. supra note 7, 363-364; McCoimncx, op. cit. supra note
7, 264.
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the state's power to search and seize under valid search warrants. This
would be a change in the law, at least on the federal level.
It is believed that such a solution reaches a workable balance be-
tween the right of organized society to protect itself and the inherent
rights of individuals so dear to a freedom-loving people.
Tom SoYAI~s
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SELF-INCRIMINATION-SCIENTIFIC
TESTS OF BODY SUBSTANCES AS EVIDENCE'
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that no person accused of crime shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Most of the states,2 in somewhat varying lan-
guage within their constitutions,3 also provide such protection against
self-incrimination. 4 In recent years the courts throughout the United
States have had to face the problem of whether this privilege against
self-incrimination extends beyond the historic concept of testimonial
compulsion and the compulsory production of papers in open court 5
to cover non-testimonial, physical evidence of crime. The specific
types of non-testimonial, physical evidence selected for treatment here-
in13 are the scientific tests of body substances, such as blood, urine
and stomach contents. Since the very nature of these tests requires an
invasion of the bodily security (extraction of body fluids), the privi-
lege against self-incrimination usually appears appropriate to defense
attorneys as the basis for an objection to the use of such tests.7 The
purpose of this note, therefore, will be to consider whether the use of
evidence obtained by such procedure is prohibited by the privilege
against self-incrimination.
1 The validity and accuracy of such tests are not within the scope of this
paper. See Gibson and Ladd, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests To Determine
Intoxication. 29 VA. L. REV. 749 (1943).
2 New Jersey and Iowa have no constitutional provisions pertaining to self-
incrimination, but they do have statutory provisions which cover the "privilege".
See 8 ViGMonE, EvmENCE sec. 2252, p. 320 (3d ed. 1940).
3 Typical of such language variation is Kentucky's Constitution which states,
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused... cannot be compelled to give evidence
against himself .. " CONSTITUTION OF KENTUCKY, See. 11 (1893).
4 Wigmore points out that the varying language is of no significance since all
the phrases bad a common conception m me common law. 8 WiGmoRE, EvIDENcE
362 (3d ed. 1940).
5 8 WiMornE, EVDENCE 363 (3d ed. 1940).
0 Other types of non-testimonial evidence will not be discussed, except as
they incidentally involve body substance tests.
7 Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests To Determine Al-
coholic Intoxication, 36 J. OF CPms. LAw AND CuMIINOLOGY 132 (1945-46).
